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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ant's property. The opinion of the court of appeals on law from judg-
ment for the defendants on the pleadings contains a good summation on
the law of easements.
The opinion notes that an easement may be acquired only by grant,
express or implied, or by prescription. For an easement to exist by virtue
of an implied grant, as contended by plaintiff, there must be a showing
of necessity, and not merely hardship or inconvenience.
MARSHALL I. NURENBERG
SALES
Liability for Injuries Arising Out of Defective Condition
of Goods Purchased
Probably more opinions are written on one comparatively narrow area
of the whole law of sales than on all the rest of this subject - liability
for injuries arising out of defective condition of the goods sold. The
difficulties of proving negligence on the part of the retailer and of apply-
ing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when suit is against the manufacturer
have led many lawyers to attempt recovery on the basis of the warranty
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act.' But even here there are problems,
centering around the doctrine of privity.
In Welsh v. Ledyard, d.b.a. Western Auto Store,2 the Supreme Court
had before it the problem which arises when the article purchased causes
harm to one other than the purchaser thereof. Previously, in Canton Pro-
vision Co. v. Gauder,3 the Supreme Court had permitted a recovery
against the retailer by the daughter of the purchaser of allegedly unwhole-
some food, but only on a tort theory. In Wood v. General Electric Com-
pany4 the court specifically held that while a subpurchaser from the
manufacurer of an inherently dangerous article (here an appliance) might
recover from the manufacturer for negligence in its manufacture which
caused harm to the subpurchaser or his property by reason of a latent defect
therein, no recovery could be had against the manufacturer based upon
implied warranty of fitness.
An analogous situation arises when the injury is caused to a member
1. OHio REv. CODE §§ 1315.13, 1315.14.
2. 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E.2d 299 (1957).
3. 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935).
4. 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953).
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of the purchaser's family. There is no privity of contract in the ordinary
sense and recovery is often denied on warranty, even against the retailer.
Such was the result in the Welsh case, in which a wife was injured when an
electric cooker sold to her husband by defendant retailer exploded. She
sued on breach of an express warranty of fimess, as the court construed
her petition. It found neither express nor implied warranty, no allega-
tions of agency of the husband in making the purchase and none of a
contract for the benefit of the wife as a third party beneficiary, and af-
firmed a judgment of the trial court on an instructed verdict for defendant.
In some other areas, however, new law was made with respect to the
nature and extent of warranties, both express and implied. In Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co.,5 decided two months after Welsh v. Ledyard,
the Supreme Court unanimously held that when one purchases an article
(here not food) from a manufacturer who in his advertising makes
representations as to the quality and merit of his product aimed directly
at the ultimate consumer, urging such consumer to purchase the product
from a retailer, and the consumer does so in reliance on and pursuant to
the inducements of the manufacturer, the ultimate consumer may main-
tain an action for damages directly against the manufacturer based on
express warranty for injury suffered in the use of such product by reason
of deleterious ingredients in the product. The Supreme Court did not
have before it for decision the question whether such a plaintiff could
recover on an implied warranty. The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga
County, about two months after the Rogers case, so held in Markovich v.
McKesson and Robbins, Inc.6 Here, too, plaintiff sued the manufacturer.
The product, as in the Rogers case, was a permanent wave package, con-
taining chemicals. Plaintiffs petition contained allegations sounding in
negligence, express warranty and implied warranty. By virtue of the di-
rection by the trial court of a verdict for defendant manufacturer in the
Markovich case, the question of negligence and implied warranty was
squarely presented to the court of appeals. The issue before the appellate
court was whether plaintiff should have been allowed to go to the jury
on the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
The court of appeals held that plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury
on negligence pursuant to Sicard v. Kremer,r on express warranty pursuant
to Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent, and on implied warranty pursuant
to dictum in the Rogers case to the effect that ". . . should a case come
5. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); see also 9 WEST. Ras. L. Ray. 511
(1958), and discussion in TORTS section, infra.
6. 106 OhioApp. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958).
7. 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938).
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before this court with facts resembling those in the Wood case, it would
then be time to re-examine and re-appraise that decision. '8
The court of appeals mentioned Welsh v. Ledyard,9 but seemed to
feel that the Rogers case, following closely on its heels, has greatly
weakened it and Wood v. General Electric.
Of course, the Wood and Welsh cases are not on all fours with the
Rogers and Markovich cases. They are distinguishable on the ground
that the injured persons in the former cases had not made the purchases
of the defective articles, whereas in the latter cases they had. But
basically, all four cases have been decided on a question of privity of
contract. It would seem that if privity is not necessary, then no contract
at all should be necessary and rather the test should be foreseeability of
harm to the person actually harmed.
Certificate of Title Act
Another case appeared in the reports during the period covered by
this survey, dealing with the Ohio Certificate of Title Act.10  It is ques-
tionable in this writer's mind whether the legislature had in mind, when
it passed the act, the effect which has been had on such collateral fields as
insurance coverage. It is probably fair to say that at least the primary
purpose of the registration acts was to prevent fraud, particularly in the
areas of the sale of stolen cars and other cases of sale beyond authority
to do so. But the injunction of the legislature that:
... No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title,
claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle sold or disposed
of, or mortagaged or encumbered, unless evidenced:(A) By a certificate of title or a manufacturer's or importer's cer-
tificate...
(B) By admission in the pleadings or stipulation of the parties..
has had a vital bearing on numerous cases in which the issue was not
so much the ownership of the auto involved in the technical sense of two
different parties contending therefor, but rather whether the auto was
covered by a particular insurance policy, usually that of a dealer in auto-
mobiles.
In Brewer v. DeCant'2 an insurer had issued a standard garage lia-
bility policy to a dealer in automobiles. "Insured" was defined to in-
8. 106 Ohio App. 265, 273, 149 N.E.2d 181, 187 (1958).
9. 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E.2d 299 (1957).
10. OHIo REv. CODE ch. 4505.
11. OHIo REv. CODE 5 4505.04.
12. 167 Ohio St. 411, 149 N.E.2d 166 (1958). See also discussion in INSURANCE
section, supra and TORTS section, infra.
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dude any person using an automobile covered by the policy, with the
permission of the named insured. The dealer in this case sold a used
automobile to one Armitage. He executed a chattel mortgage to a loan
company, but failed to pay the amount due and the loan company re-
possessed and placed the car on the dealer's lot for resale. For some
reason the title was never acquired 'by the finance company and it re-
mained in Armitage. The dealer then negotiated with DeCant for the
purchase of this automobile, as a result of which DeCant contracted to
buy it and in turn traded in an automobile owned by him. He signed a
power of attorney authorizing the dealer to sign the application for a
title, arranged for the transfer of the chattel mortgage and drove away
in his new "purchase." Twenty-four days later DeCant was involved in
an accident in which the plaintiff received injuries. It appears that "title"
at such time was still technically in Armitage.
The Supreme Court held that the insurance coverage of the dealer
extended to DeCant and that the insurance company was liable to plaintiff
on a supplemental petition filed against it after a judgment by default
against DeCant. There appear to be several bases for the result, that the
'bailment" to DeCant of the car pending sale was an "operation 'neces-
sary or incidental' to the purpose of the... dealer" within the terms of
the policy and that the words of the policy covering "the use of any
automobile in connection with" the insured's business were broad enough
to cover an automobile not titled in the insured's name. But the court
also felt it necessary to admit that for all intents and purposes it was
overruling Workman v. Republic Mutual Insurance Co.18 and Automobile
Finance Co. v. Munday.'4 If Mielke v. Leeberson' 5 and Garlick .v. MAc-
Farland'6 did not do so, it appears that this latest case has accomplished
that result. Whether necessary to the decision or not, the court specifically
held that no title to the automobile could pass to DeCant until the
certficate of title had been issued to him.
Likewise, the supreme court, in Veltri v. City of Cleveland, Cleveland
Transit System17 relied on Section 4505.04 of the Revised Code in reach-
ing a conclusion opposite to that of the Franklin County Court of Ap-
peals in Peitsmeyer v. Omar Baking Company.18 In the Peitsmeyer case
it had been held that a bailee in possession of an automobile could sue
and recover for damages done to it -by a defendant, which was certainly
13. 144 Ohio St. 37, 56 N.E.2d 190 (1944).
14. 137 Ohio St. 504, 30 N.E.2d 1002 (1940).
15. 150 Ohio St. 528, 83 N.E.2d 209 (1948).
16. 159 Ohio St. 539, 113 N.E.2d 92 (1953).
17. 167 Ohio St. 90, 146 N.E.2d 442 (1957).
18. 95 Ohio App. 37, 117 N.E.2d 184 (1952).
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